Abstract-We define a transformation of models of additivefree propositional linear logic, closely related to de Paiva's dialectica categories, but with a modified exponential based on Oliva's dialectica interpretation of higher-order linear logic. As a result of this modification we obtain an elegant factorisation of dialectica models as linear-nonlinear adjunctions. From the point of view of game semantics, the transformation can be intuitively seen as prepending games with a round of simultaneous bidding. Two theorems suggest the transformation behaves like a closure operator on models: it has a monad-like structure, and it preserves completeness.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a construction which transforms models of additive-free propositional linear logic. The construction is based on Gödel's dialectica interpretation and is closely related to de Paiva's dialectica categories.
Gödel's dialectica interpretation (?) is a syntactic transformation that translates a formula into a logically simpler formula which has free higher-type variables but no quantifiers. The purpose was to reduce the consistency of Heyting arithmetic to the consistency of a quantifer-free calculus called T, however the dialectica interpretation (and related translations, collectively called functional interpretations) now have a variety of uses in proof theory, see for example (?).
The paper (?) introduces the dialectica categories G(C), a family of models of linear logic based on the dialectica interpretation, whose objects are 'generalised relations'. Historically these models were the first to interpret all of the linear connectives without identifying multiplicatives and additives. The special case G(Set), whose objects are ordinary relations, is discussed in detail and related to game semantics in (?).
A slightly different family of dialectica categories, more important for our purposes, was introduced in (?). These generalise relations in a more intuitive way, to morphisms X × Y → R where R is a monoidal closed poset, or lineale, internal to a category. By taking R to be the two-element poset 0 < 1 we again obtain G(Set). A better-known family of models, the Chu spaces (?), is shown in (?) to be closely related.
Based on de Paiva's models, (?) gave a syntactic dialectica interpretation to first-order classical affine logic, and (?) to higher-order classical linear logic. Oliva makes a small but crucial modification to the dialectica interpretation of the exponential: whereas de Paiva and Shirahata use |!ϕ| (the precise meaning of the notation will be explained in later sections). This change allows Oliva to prove a completeness theorem analogous to Gödel's completeness theorem for the dialectica interpretation. The proof-theoretic meaning is that the dialectica interpretation does not eliminate exponentials, as it eliminates quantifiers and additives. The appearance of the exponential on the right hand sides suggests a modification to the dialectica categories, for which we need the monoidal closed poset R to also have an 'internal exponential'. Thus this work is the result of a back-and-forth of ideas between the worlds of syntax and semantics. Following this idea, we allow R to be any model of additivefree linear logic (or multiplicative-exponential linear logic, MELL), and build a model D(R) of full propositional linear logic (LL) . From a technical point of view this is only a small step from de Paiva's lineales. However the change of viewpoint is larger: whereas de Paiva's constructions are seen as building models from scratch, the new construction is more naturally seen as a method for transforming models. Likely this change in viewpoint results from the fact that nontrivial interpretations of the exponentials are much harder to find than interpretations of multiplicatives. From the point of view of game semantics the D construction has a particularly intuitive explanation, namely it modifies games by prepending a round of 'simultaneous bidding'. This point of view is elaborated in section IV where the action of D on the Abramsky-Jagadeesan model (?) is given explicitly, resulting in 'Abramsky-Jagadeesan games with bidding'.
By modifying the interpretation of the exponential in this way we obtain:
• An elegant factorisation of dialectica models as linearnonlinear adjunctions (section III) • A monad-like structure on the dialectica interpretation of MELL (section VI) • A completeness theorem for the dialectica interpretation of MELL requiring no characterising principles (section VII)
Together, the second and third results intuitively suggest that the dialectica interpretation of MELL can be thought of as a 'closure operator' which improves the completeness of models. As a metaphor we can imagine models of MELL being subsets of some topological space X, where we interpret larger subsets as 'more complete' models (that is, models which validate fewer unprovable formulas). The operator D is then a closure operator on X, which generally makes sets larger, but is idempotent. An analysis of the formulas validated by D(R) for full propositional linear logic, which requires a cut-elimination argument, will appear in a future paper. This is discussed, as well as several other research directions, in section VIII.
II. CATEGORIES OF ZERO-SUM GAMES
We consider a very general notion of finite two-player zero-sum game, and two different notions of morphism of such games, corresponding to linear and intuitionistic logic respectively. We will say linear game and intuitionistic game even though these notions differ only in their morphisms. Intuitively we can think of linear games as simultaneous games, and intuitionistic games as sequential games in which Eloise moves first, however the data specifying the games is the same for both cases.
We have a pair of players Eloise and Abelard, who choose moves from finite sets X, Y , not both empty (the requirement of finiteness is not used, it is only a conceptual simplification). The outcomes of the game are elements of a poset (R, ≤), which may be large (ie. a proper class). Intuitively, a < b means the outcome b is more desirable for Eloise, and a is more desirable for Abelard. We generalise further and allow R to be a (large) category, and write a < b whenever hom R (a, b) is nonempty and a = b whenever hom R (a, b) and hom R (b, a) are both nomempty. Formally, this is the result of applying the canonical functor from large categories to large posets, which first identifies morphisms with the same domain and codomain to obtain a preorder, and then identifies isomorphism classes to obtain a partial order. The proof-theoretic reason for doing this is that the dialectica interpretation is proof-agnostic in the following sense. Consider the dialectica interpretation of an intuitionistic implication ϕ → ψ. A witness for this is a pair of functions f, g such that for all x, v it is provable that |ϕ|
v . We don't care which proof is used, so long as one exists.
Outcomes of plays of the game are given by a (class) function X × Y → R, which is a functor from the finite discrete category X ×Y to R. If G is a game then the outcome of the play in which Eloise plays x and Abelard plays y will be denoted G x y . The game will sometimes be called G X Y , and X will be called the positive set and Y the negative set. Both the sets from which moves are chosen and the outcomes of plays will be compactly specified by the notation
where the right hand side is an expression involving x and y, resulting in an object of R. We consider morphisms of intuitionistic games first. These are closely related to the 'intuitionistic dialectica categories' D(C) of (?). Given games G X Y and H U V , we must specify what it means to play H relative to G. The dynamics of an intuitionistic game is that Eloise moves before Abelard, and for a relative game we use a certain interleaving of moves: 1) Abelard chooses x ∈ X 2) Eloise chooses u ∈ U 3) Abelard chooses v ∈ V 4) Eloise chooses y ∈ Y Thus a strategy for Eloise consists of functions f : X → U and g : X × V → Y . Such a strategy is winning iff for all x ∈ X and v ∈ V we have
That is, for all x and v there must be an R-morphism from G
For the purposes of categorical logic, there is a better definition which remembers the structure of R: a morphism consists of functions f, g together with an X × V -indexed family of R-morphisms from G x g(x,v) to H f x v . However in this paper we will continue to use the forgetful definition for simplicity.
Now let G X Y and H U V be linear games. The appropriate notion of morphism for such games is to allow Eloise's move u ∈ U to depend only on Abelard's move x ∈ X, and Eloise's move y ∈ Y to depend only on Abelard's move v ∈ V . Thus a strategy for Eloise consists of functions f : X → U and g : V → Y , and a strategy is winning iff for all x ∈ X and v ∈ V we have G
This 'game' cannot be physically played because of the cross-dependence of moves, unless we consider the strategies themselves as moves. These dynamics are discussed from a game-semantic point of view in (?). Given the category R we have thus defined two more categories: D i (R) is the category of intuitionistic games with outcomes in R, and D l (R) is the category of linear games with outcomes in R. Proof: This is a special case of the proofs in (?) that the dialectica categories D(C) and G(C) are categories.
III. THE DIALECTICA TRANSFORMATION OF A MODEL
We begin with a general definition of a model of MELL and a model of LL. A model of multiplicative linear logic (MLL) is given by a * -autonomous category R, ie. a symmetric monoidal closed category (R, ⊗, ⊸, 1) with a functor ⊥ : R → R and natural isomorphisms ⊥ • ⊥ ∼ = id R and
For the interpretation of exponentials we follow (?). A categorical model of MELL is given by a * -autonomous category R together with another category S with finite products and an adjunction 
and the unit and counit of the adjunction must also respect the monoidal and cartesian monoidal structures (ie. the adjunction must be a symmetric monoidal adjunction). Such a setup is called a linear-nonlinear adjunction. Given this adjunction, the denotation of the exponential ! is the composition L•M , which is a comonad on R. The entire model, which contains a pair of categories and functors and various natural transformations, will be denoted R.
For a model of LL we simply require that R also has finite products.
Given such a model of MELL, the dialectica transformation of this model will be a new pair of categories and a linear-nonlinear adjunction
The categories D l (R) and D i (S) are precisely the categories defined in the previous section, of linear and intuitionistic games with outcomes in R and S respectively. The transformations of the functors L and M will be given below. The transformed model as a whole will be denoted D(R).
The interpretations of each connective in D l (R) is given in figure 1 .
The proofs of lemmas 2 and 3 are skipped because they are tedious and very similar to the soundness proofs for dialectica categories (?) and Chu spaces (?).
Lemma 2. D l (R) is a * -autonomous category with monoidal product ⊗, unit 1, internal hom ⊸, involution ⊥ and dualising object ⊥.
Since the dialectica interpretation eliminates linear additives, we get finite products for free.
Lemma 3. D l (R) has initial object 0, terminal object ⊤, products given by & and coproducts given by ⊕. Now we give the dialectica transformations D f (M ) and D m (L) of multiplication and linearisation functors. The operation D f is a straightforward lifting operation. The subscript f stands for functor since this construction will be used in section V to give the action of D on morphisms (or functors) of models. Suppose the multiplication functor is M : R → S. We need to find an element of
is a symmetrybreaking operation that gives Abelard second-turn advantage in a game. The subscript m stands for minorisation (this name is discussed below). The action on objects
Now suppose we have a morphism of
given by f : X → U and g : X × V → Y . For all x ∈ X and h : U → V we need to find an element of
which, by the definition of g ′ , is
Since L is a functor we have
Then by the definition of the action of L on objects we have
Proof: The equation for the adjunction is
which is
These are the sets of morphisms f :
The other conditions for a linear-nonlinear adjunction are omitted for space.
Notice that
The minorisation operation, which modifies a simultaneous game by giving the second player second-turn advantage, was first defined in (?). This three-part factorisation
where M ⊣ L • M seems to be a feature of dialectica-like models. However, if we see games in D i (S) as sequential and D l (R) as simultaneous then M is not an operation that makes intuitive sense. In this case, if we begin with a model in which R = S and L is the identity functor then D m (L) is a forgetful functor that forgets the sequential structure of a game. Now we can derive the interpretation of ! as the composition
where the exponential on the right hand side is ! = L • M . The interpretation of ? is the dualisation
The lemmas in this section add up to a soundness theorem.
IV. ABRAMSKY-JAGADEESAN GAMES WITH BIDDING
In this section we show explicitly the application of D to the Abramsky-Jagadeesan model of MLL (?). This simple example illustrates a very general phenomenon: D modifies game semantics by prepending a round of bidding. We begin by recalling the basic definitions of that paper.
We begin with a set M of moves with a labelling function λ : M → {E, A} indicating which player (Eloise or Abelard) makes each move. Let M * be the set of finite sequences of moves with alternating labels, and M ω the set of infinite sequences of moves with alternating labels. A play is a finite or infinite sequence of moves with alternating labels whose first element is labelled A (that is, Abelard always moves first). P ⊆ M * is the set of valid positions of the game, which must be nonempty and prefix-closed. W ⊆ M ω is the set of infinite plays which we declare to be won by Eloise. Given a finite play π, we say that Eloise wins π iff she played the last move in π. If π is infinite then we say that Eloise wins iff π ∈ W .
A strategy σ for Eloise is a partial function from valid plays in which Abelard moved last to moves for Eloise, such that if π is a valid play and σ is defined at π then extending π with σ(π) results in a valid play. Similarly a counter-strategy for Abelard is a partial function from plays in which Eloise moved last to valid moves for Abelard, where we consider that Eloise moved last in the empty play (so Abelard always moves first). Given a strategy σ and a counter-strategy τ , we can play σ against τ in the obvious way to obtain a play π(σ, τ ). A strategy σ for Eloise is called a winning strategy if Eloise wins the play π(σ, τ ) for all counter-strategies τ .
We define two operations on games: linear negation ⊥ and tensor product ⊗. The linear negation of a game is simply the result of interchanging the roles of Eloise and Abelard. The tensor product is given by playing a pair of games in parallel, in the following sense. Suppose we have games G = (M G , λ G , P G , W G ) and H = (M H , λ H , P H , W H ). The set of moves of G ⊗ H is the disjoint union M H⊗H = M G + M H , and the labelling is unchanged. The valid plays M G⊗H is the set of plays π satisfying 1) Restricting π to moves of G results in a valid play of G, and similarly for H 2) If π contains a pair of consecutive moves x, y with x ∈ M G and y ∈ M H , or with x ∈ M H and y ∈ M G , then x is labelled by A. In words, only Abelard can switch between the two components. This is called the switching convention. We also obtain a denotation of multiplicative disjunction & by duality. A winning strategy for H relative to G is a winning strategy for G ⊥ & H. Let AJ be the * -autonomous category of Abramsky-Jagadeesan games and relative winning strategies.
Consider an element G X Y of the category D l (AJ). It consists of finite sets X and Y , and for each (x, y) ∈ X × Y , an Abramsky-Jagadeesan game G x y . Eloise wins this game iff there is a move x ∈ X such that for all y ∈ Y , G x y is a win for Eloise. This is equivalent to Eloise having a winning strategy in G x y for all y ∈ Y , which is in turn equivalent to Eloise having a winning strategy in the compound game in which first x and y are simultaneously bid, and then the game G x y is played. This is precisely a winning strategy for a compound game in which an Abramsky-Jagadeesan game is preceeded by a simultaneous bidding round.
Linear negation in D l (AJ) is still given by interchange of players. This is because the general linear negation of D l (R) is to interchange X and Y and then apply the linear negation of R, which in this case is also interchange of players.
For a tensor product G X Y ⊗ H U V we have a bidding round which cannot be physically played, in which Eloise simultaneously bids x ∈ X and u ∈ U , and Abelard bids y ∈ Y and v ∈ V with y allowed to depend on u and v on x. After bidding, the games G We can see D l (AJ) as a variant of the dialectica interpretation in which witnesses are drawn from the category of finite sets, and truth values are drawn from the category of Abramsky-Jagadeesan games. This can be contrasted with (?), which gives a variant of the modified realisability interpretation of Peano arithmetic, in which witnesses are drawn from (a variant of) the category of Hyland-Ong games, and truth values are the ordinary truth values of Peano arithmetic. Although the dialectica and modified realisability interpretations are closely related (?), these two constructions are rather different: from a game semantic point of view. Blot's modified realisability can be seen as games with only a bidding round without the following round, but in which the strategies for bidding must be strategies for Hyland-Ong games. On the other hand, D l (AJ) allows arbitrary set-theoretic strategies for the bidding round, although we could obtain a hybrid construction by replacing the category FinSet with another category.
V. MORPHISMS OF LINEAR-NONLINEAR ADJUNCTIONS
We have defined a construction D which transforms a model of MELL into a model of LL. In order to talk about further structure of D we need a notion of morphism of models. There is a certain obvious choice of definition, namely a pair of functors which commute with all of the algebraic structure of a linear-nonlinear adjunction. The class of models of MELL and the class of models of LL with respect to this notion of morphism form categories, with respect to which D is a functor. However if we weaken our notion of morphism slightly we can moreover obtain a monad-like structure on D.
Definition 1 (Morphism of models). Let
A strong morphism of models consists of a pair of functors F : R → R ′ and G : S → S ′ such that we have commuting squares
together with the algebraic properties
• F 1 = 1 where 1 ∈ R and 1 ∈ R ′ are the monoidal units 
where the right square must commute but the left only requires a natural transformation. We also only require F to be lax monoidal, that is, F x ⊗ F y ≤ F (x ⊗ y) for x, y ∈ R. All other conditions remain the same.
We have thus defined four categories. The categories of models and strong morphisms will be called MELL -Mod and LL -Mod. The categories of models and weak morphisms will be called MELL -Mod w and LL -Mod w . In the remainder of this paper we will be concerned mainly with weak morphisms of models. This will be motivated in the next section, in which it is proved that the dialectica interpretation has a monad-like structure on the category of weak morphisms, but this result does not hold for strong morphisms.
Suppose we have a weak morphism from
and similarly for D f (G) :
Lemma 5. D is a well-defined functor

MELL -Mod w → LL -Mod w
Proof: We need to prove that
is a morphism of LL -Mod w , given that F, G is a morphism of MELL -Mod w . For reasons of space only the cases for exponentials and ⊗ are included. For exponentials we need to prove
We are given a natural transformation η :
The identity functions give such a morphism, because
For the right hand square let
These are equal because
The identity maps give a relative winning strategy
because we have
The other cases of the proof are very similar: they all involve computing a pair of games and constructing relative winning strategies.
VI. THE DIALECTICA INTERPRETATION IS A MONAD
We have defined the dialectica transformation as a functor D : MELL -Mod w → LL -Mod w . Since every model of LL is also a model of MELL by forgetting the products in R, we also have a forgetful functor U : LL -Mod w → MELL -Mod w . The composition U • D is therefore an endofunctor on MELL -Mod w . It turns out that U • D is a 'near monad' in the sense that the required natural transformations exist but one of the monad laws fails. In the remainder of this section we will abuse notation by writing D for U • D.
The unit
takes an object x ∈ R to the game with one play and outcome x,
It takes a morphism in hom R (x, y) to the unique strategy with the correct type (with both functions taking * to * ), which is a winning strategy. Next we consider the multiplication
. For a particular play x, y the game has an outcome G x y ∈ D l (R), which is itself a game. Suppose this game is defined by
where U x, f y, g
The witness sets are dependent types in the category of finite sets, so an element (x, f ) ∈ x y U x y consists of a point x ∈ X and a function f with the property that f y ∈ U x y for every y ∈ Y . This will sometimes be written using the dependent type theory notation l (R) from G to H consists of functions f : X → Z and g : W → Y such that for every x ∈ X and w ∈ W we have functions
We need to produce a morphism from µ R (G) to µ R (H), that is, we need functions
These are defined by
Since a weak morphism consists of a pair of functors R → R ′ and S → S ′ we define both functors in the same way (with a minor change needed to the action on the morphisms of S). The operations η and µ are illustrated in figure 2.
Proof: For reasons of space only some cases of this proof for µ R are included. Although tedious, this proof is important because it fails to hold for the category of strong morphisms, and it is the cases that fail that motivate the definition of weak morphism.
Suppose we have games
We need to construct a relative winning strategy
The game µ R G ⊗ µ R H has positive set and negative set
To define a function
suppose we are given ((x, α), (w, β)) where α : (y : Y ) → U x y and β : (z : Z) → P w z . We need to define
which can be given by
In the other direction we need to define a function
Consider the left projection of this function. As input we are given the data
We must produce y : Y and h ′ : (x : X) → V (x, y). We take y = f w and
The right projection is symmetric.
Notice that there is no relative winning strategy
so we cannot extend µ R to a natural transformation for the category of strong morphisms. For the exponentials we need to show
For the square on the right consider the game
we indeed find that they are both equal to
For the square on the left suppose instead that G ∈ D
There is a map
There is also a map
As input we are given the data
We must produce y : Y and h ′ : (
This case also fails for strong morphisms because there is no general function
The first monad law holds, but only up to natural isomorphism.
Theorem 2. There are natural isomorphisms
We can directly compute:
These are both naturally isomorphic to G X Y . The second monad law
We can directly compute
We also get
There is a natural transformation
However there is none in the opposite direction. Similarly there is a natural transformation
f y gx but none in the opposite direction. As a result, there is no morphism of D l (R) in either direction between the games
The natural transformations η and µ give a high-level explanation of some aspects of the dialectica interpretation, by giving 'embeddings' of the models R and D 2 (R) into D(R). Intuitively, the first tells us that the dialectica interpretation loses no information, and the second tells us that applying the dialectica interpretation twice gains no more information than applying it once. However the logical significance of the failure of the second monad law, and the failure of µ to exist for strong morphisms, still requires explanation. 
VII. RELATIVE COMPLETENESS FOR MELL
Proof: Let ϕ be a formula of MELL with interpretation |ϕ| X Y in D(R). We must prove: 1) There exists x ∈ X such that for all y ∈ Y , [ϕ] v ≤ |ϕ| 2) There exists y ∈ Y such that for all x ∈ X, |ϕ| x y ≤ [ϕ] v These are proved simultaneously by induction on the formula ϕ. In the base case we have that ϕ = p is an atom, and the point * witnesses both (1) and (2).
In the negation case for (1) the inductive hypothesis for (2) gives y ∈ Y such that for all x ∈ X, |ϕ|
The case for (2) is symmetric.
For (1) of ⊗, the inductive hypothesis gives x and u such that for all y and v we have ϕ ≤ |ϕ| Proof: Let ϕ and ψ be formulas of MELL such that for all valuations in D(R) there is a morphism in D l (R) from |ϕ| to |ψ|. Let v be a valuation in R and let | · | be the corresponding valuation defined in the previous lemma. Then
Since the witnesses for η R are trivial we have
Since v was arbitrary and R is complete we get that the sequent ϕ ⊢ ψ is derivable in MELL, as required. Note that unlike the completeness proof in (?), on which this proof is based, we require no characterising principles. The reason for this seems to be that the quantifiers of the inductive hypothesis ϕ ⇐⇒ ∃x ∀y |ϕ| x y have been 'externalised' in the inductive hypothesis of lemma 7. To the author's knowledge, this is the first variant of the dialectica interpretation with no characterising principles, or to say it another way, the first variant of the dialectica interpretation that is complete for a logic with full cutelimination. Of course from some perspectives the loss of characterising principles is a weakness. If we re-introduce additives or quantifiers this result fails, as is discussed in the next section.
VIII. FURTHER DIRECTIONS
There are several aspects of this work that suggest further investigation:
1) The most obvious question is: if R is a complete model of MELL, as in the hypothesis of the previous theorem, how complete is D(R) for full propositional linear logic? By analogy to the dialectica interpretation in higher types, the author conjectures that D(R) is complete for the logic obtained by extending LL with certain formulas of the form
and !(ϕ ⊕ ψ) ⊸ !ϕ ⊕ !ψ These formulas are propositional analogues respectively of independence of premise (IP l ) and trump advantage (T A), which are characterising principles in (?). Both are intuitively justified by the resource interpretation: for the first, if we have either ϕ or ψ together with χ then we either have ϕ together with χ or ψ together with χ; for the second, if we an infinite supply of things that are either ϕ or ψ then by the infinite pigeonhole principle we have either an infinite supply of ϕ or an infinite supply of ψ. The author is currently working on a proof of this classification, using a cut-elimination argument, which will appear in a future paper. The central idea of the proof is to extend linear logic with a new kind of formula, called simultaneous additives, which have a similar relationship to ordinary additives as Henkin quantifiers have to ordinary higher-type quantifiers. The dialectica interpretation of such a simultaneous additive is given precisely by the natural transformation µ. In the presence of these new formulas, and certain characterising principles, we can prove completeness. The most difficult part of the proof is using cut-elimination to conclude that this new logic is conservative over a certain extension of ordinary linear logic. 2) The appearance of dependent types in D(R) suggests a hybrid approach where rather than using sets and settheoretic functions we use the objects and morphisms of another locally cartesian closed category C. By taking C to be a dependent type theory (with types as objects and terms as morphisms) we can obtain a purely syntactic transformation similar to the original dialectica interpretation. A particularly interesting idea is to find a variant which refutes the characterising principles mentioned in point (1), which would lead to a complete model. We conjecture that this is impossible, and no dialectica-like model can be complete for full propositional linear logic. 3) Similarly, we can replace the category of sets with a dependently-typed programming language such as Agda (?). This would give a simple way to embed linear reasoning in a programming language. Since most of the proofs in this paper amount to constructing inhabitants of dependent types, they are natural candidates for formalisation in Agda. The author intends to verify the proofs in this paper in this way. 4) By changing the interpretation of exponentials we can make 'semantic' equivalents of other functional interpretations besides the dialectica interpretation. See (?) for the relationship between different functional interpretations and the semantics of the linear exponential. However the dialectica interpretation is the only functional interpretation whose exponential does not use highertype quantifiers, so other functional interpretations will require starting with a model of full linear logic in higher types. This might be an interesting exercise, to translate the heavily syntactic literature on functional interpretations into the language of semantics, but it is unlikely to produce any interesting models.
